Comparative Report on transnational dynamics and the impact on/from the EU in the Western Balkans and the MENA region

PUBLICATIONS

PAVE has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 870769.

PAVE Consortium

PAVE Publications

Published by Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). May 2022.
This publication is part of WP6 of the PAVE project, led by the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

Authors: Triantafyllos Karatrantos and Ioannis Armakolas

Design: EURICE GmbH

The authors are solely responsible for its content, it does not represent the opinion of the European Commission and the Commission is not responsible for any use that might be made of data appearing therein.

To cite: Triantafyllos Karatrantos & Ioannis Armakolas 2023. Comparative Report on transnational dynamics and the impact on/from the EU in the Western Balkans and the MENA region. PAVE Project Publications.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ... 4

2 Risk factors ... 6

2.1 Identity crisis, (dis-)integration, discrimination ... 6

2.2 International geopolitics and military interventions/perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy ... 13

2.3 Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state actors ... 16

2.4 Role of the Internet/social media and dissemination of radical propaganda ... 19

2.5 External influence of state and non-state actors ... 20

2.6 Linkages with foreign terrorist fighters or other radicalised persons ... 22

3 Resilience factors ... 26

3.1 Successful integration – engagement and cooperation between the host country and the communities ... 27

3.2 Community cohesion programmes linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives . 28

3.3 Pluralistic inter-religion dialogue and initiatives to avoid the stigmatisation and separation of Islam from other religions ... 30

3.4 Cooperation with the communities and engagement of credible and moderate voices 32

3.5 Counter-narratives, use of social media ... 32

4 Gender ... 33

5 Conclusions ... 34

6 Bibliography ... 39

1 Introduction

Transregional dynamics is the fourth research cluster of the PAVE project. This cluster is based on the empirical study of transnational dynamics fuelling cross-border manifestations of violent extremism between Europe, the Balkans and the MENA region, with a special emphasis on the role of diaspora communities.

Islamist extremism has important transnational and transregional dynamics. Violent non-state organisations, social movements and foreign states are among the main transregional actors that can affect the trends and factors of radicalisation. The main forms of transregional and transnational involvement are the preparation and implementation of attacks and the recruitment of radicalised persons from terrorist organisations outside of the above-mentioned regions, the promotion of conservative and radical interpretations of Islam and Islamism by Islamist activists and movements, the involvement of foreign states in order to promote specific doctrines of Islam and to influence religious institutions and actors, and the role of transnational actors as foreign terrorist fighters or terrorist cells and hit squads. The main consequence of this transregional process is the differentiation of radicalisation trends and the development of new push factors in the dynamics of violent extremism. One important variable is diaspora communities' involvement in the radicalisation process. Although this is not a new phenomenon, new trends have begun to emerge in the global jihadist movement's modus operandi. In recent years the radicalisation of diaspora communities in Europe has been the topic of one of the most intense and contentious academic and public debates in the field of violent extremism. Within this framework, the external influence of the Salafist jihadist variant of militant Islamism is the main point of discussion as a source of radicalisation.

While the external influence of the Salafist jihadist variant of militant Islamism is the main point of discussion with diaspora communities when it comes to identifying sources of radicalisation, it is not the only framework used in diaspora analysis within the PAVE project. Other issues, such as failures of integration, marginalisation and the perception of discrimination, are among the possible factors that may contribute to diaspora radicalisation (Zimmermann and Rosenau 2009). One important dimension to consider when researching diaspora radicalisation is the mutual influence between external forces and autonomous militancy (Waldman 2010). To that end, the research on the radicalisation of diaspora communities and transregional linkages is based on three levels of analysis: micro (individual identity and community), meso (dynamics and environment) and macro (host and home countries) (Haider 2015).

The research on the transregional and transnational dynamics of violent extremism relies on network analysis. There is a need for a better understanding of the complex and diverse dynamics of transnational and transregional radicalisation and development of violent extremism between the MENA region and the Western Balkans, as well as between those regions and the EU Member States. Networks are important not only for the planning of attacks but also for the recruitment of foreign fighters and the spread of radical interpretations of Islam.

The literature shows that enhancing positive factors is easier than mitigating negative conditions in effective prevention of radicalisation. The strength-based approach highlights the importance of developing individual and societal resilience to radicalisation and violent extremism. Integration was, from the beginning, one very important factor in order to counter radicalisation and terrorism. For example, the United States and to some extent Canada have, post-9/11, aimed to devise interconnected integration and security measures as part of prevention and de-radicalisation interventions (Zimmermann and Rosenau, 2009). Schmid (2013) outlines that the primary focus of many counter-radicalisation efforts is not the terrorists themselves but strengthening and empowering the communities from which they might emerge. The premise is that local diaspora communities in the West should be as interested as the host government in keeping their neighbourhoods free of violent extremists. Community outreach is thus a key component of many de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation initiatives.

Utilising this literature and the knowledge on vulnerability/risk factors and resilience/protective factors, the PAVE project developed a framework to analyse the risk and resilience of Muslim diaspora communities in Europe based on six risk and five resilience factors:

- Risk Factor 1: Identity crisis, disintegration, discrimination.
- Risk Factor 2: International geopolitics and military interventions/perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy.
- Risk Factor 3: Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state organisations.
- Risk Factor 4: Role of Internet/social media and dissemination of radical propaganda.
- Risk Factor 5: External influence of state and non-state actors.
- Risk Factor 6: Linkages with foreign terrorist fighters or other radicalised persons.

- Resilience Factor 1: Successful integration – engagement and cooperation between the host country and the communities.

- Resilience Factor 2: Community cohesion programmes linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives.
- Resilience Factor 3: Pluralistic inter-religion dialogue and initiatives to avoid the stigmatisation and separation of Islam from other religions.
- Resilience Factor 4: Cooperation with the communities and engagement of credible and moderate voices.
- Resilience Factor 5: Counter-narratives, use of social media.

The empirical research was conducted with semi-flex interviews and focus groups involving members of diaspora communities in EU countries, key informants, practitioners and researchers working with diaspora communities.

Diaspora Communities: Greece (Pakistani and Afghan), Ireland (Pakistani, Iraqi, Sikh, Nigerian and Kosovar), Germany (Bosnian and Palestinian), Spain (Amazigh), Denmark (Palestinian) and France (Palestinian).

2 Risk factors

This section provides the analytical overview of the six risk factors for diaspora community members' vulnerability to radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

2.1 Identity crisis, (dis-)integration, discrimination

Identity crisis has been identified as one of the most important risk factors that may lead to violent extremism. In recent years, we have observed the engagement of young second- or third-generation immigrants as perpetrators in many of the terrorist attacks in various EU countries. Among the different stories and backgrounds of these individuals, we can emphasise the issue of identity crisis and mainly the non-belonging phenomenon. Usually, the perception of non-belonging manifests as a disconnect between two worlds – the country of origin and the country of residence. An individual with identity confusion may feel detached from both countries.

Studies on radicalisation find that the search for identity is a key influence in radicalisation processes (Al Raffie, 2013; Vidino, 2011). This is particularly the case for second- and third-generation immigrants/refugees, who have fewer ties to their country of origin than their parents or grandparents. Events in the homeland, while more important to first-generation immigrants, are less likely to be a significant influence in radicalisation processes of later generations (Vidino, 2011).

A very important parameter that could lead to identity crisis is cultural marginalisation, the feeling of being alienated from the culture of origin and not integrated into the culture of the host country (Abbas and Siddique, 2012; Parent and Ellis, 2011; Sirseloudi, 2012; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, 2010). Another important issue is the separation of religion from culture of origin, which may lead Muslim diaspora communities to identify themselves as members of the global Islamic community (Ummah). A crucial step in this direction is solidarity with Muslim victims of war worldwide (Sirseloudi, 2012). Among second and third generations of immigrant and diaspora groups, adherence to religion is seen more as an individual decision, rather than shaped by loyalty to the home country, as has been the case for the first generation (Sirseloudi, 2012).

In direct contrast to many scholars, Olivier Roy does not adopt the vertical and linear approach that goes from the Qur'an to the Islamic State with the constant Islamic violence that manifests itself in various phases. On the contrary, he proposes a "transversal approach that attempts to interpret modern Islamic violence in parallel with related forms of violence and radicalism (youth uprising, radical rupture with society, aesthetics of violence, integration of the cut-off individual into a globalised narrative)."

Finally, discrimination (whether real or perceived) can be a source of frustration that can contribute to identity crises. Victoroff et al. (2012) suggest that some victims of perceived discrimination (particularly religious minorities) may react with aggression, including political violence.

Some members of the Amazigh diaspora community in Spain considered themselves Amazigh and Arab at the same time, although they claimed to have an identity crisis for not knowing how to identify themselves in different spaces such as in the international Spanish school, in Morocco and in Spain, because of the language and culture:

"I have always considered myself to have an identity crisis, because I have studied at a Spanish school in Morocco and as you can imagine, I went to school and it was all in Spanish. Then I would go out into the street, they were Berber, then I would go to my house and we would speak in Darija because my father does not speak Berber. So there were like three languages and it was like an identity crisis, because right now I'm going to Morocco and I don't consider myself Moroccan, but then I come to Spain and I'm not Spanish. So it's like a loop there that basically I don't know where I'm from."

The case of Ireland differs in the extent of the identity crisis phenomenon. Young people's identity crisis plays a role as a risk factor that could lead to radicalisation.

“And because young people are often confused, and they're all looking for their own identity, so they're going through identity crisis, and some of them, they want belonging, they want a sense of belonging. You see that in Ireland. I have noticed it but not a lot, a few individuals.”

However, it is a minority of the youth that goes through identity crises and those who do are from the most deprived areas and cannot find a job.

Perceived ‘lack of belonging’ can be a factor when there is ‘dual identity’ and peer pressure can push it both ways.

“I think a lot of the time when there's dual identity, and sometimes even multiple identities, you feel like you don't belong with any community. So, like, within Irish society, you're visibly different, whether that be skin colour, or the way you dress, your accent, the way you behave. But then within the Muslim community, or even just like within family dynamics, the way you are behaving might be considered against the religion and the image of the parents.”

References to the new generation of migrants and refugees in Ireland are also crucial, since many new people arrived from war-torn regions with deep sectarian divisions. These backgrounds are a factor that may influence integration.

“We've invited priests and we've invited other faith leaders, and there is always a small segment of the community that would question this and the reason they do that is because of where they have come from, and they have lived their life, they have never experienced this. And for them, it's completely new. It's like, how can you? They have come from societies where there are so many obstacles and so much division, they have sectarianism. So, for example, in a Sunni mosque, they would not accept having a Shia in the mosque. And they see that here in a mosque in Ireland, there is a Christian, there is a Jew, and all of them are sitting together.”

The issue of religious leaders is also important for the Muslim communities in Ireland. Lack of engagement with the issue led to inaction on the part of the Irish state to either recognise existing religious leaders or appoint new ones. Generally, there needs to be more expertise on the side of the Irish state in relation to Islam, imams and Muslims.

Pathways of identity formation differ between the generations of Bosniaks in Germany. The early generations of labour migrants who came as temporary workers maintain(ed) a strong emotional connection to their country of origin, while later generations who were born and grew up in Germany are socialised there and their identity formation is more influenced by their German environment. The older generations often carried their religious traditions into their new home. Younger generations, on the other hand, have not experienced the practice

of Islam before the war in BiH and are therefore influenced by what their environment in Germany teaches them about Islamic practice.

Reasons for migration are relevant for the analysis of vulnerability to radicalisation. The Bosniak diaspora in Germany includes both labour migrants and war refugees. These different types of migration influence the individuals' integration process. While individuals who left their country involuntarily as refugees and carry the trauma of war and displacement are generally more vulnerable mentally, economically and concerning their legal status, labour migrants found a more comfortable situation upon their arrival in Germany. Labour migrants were given a temporary residence permit and were allowed to work and send remittances to their families at home. During the 1990s, refugees from the Bosnian war were only granted a Duldung, a temporary residence status that did not include a work permit. Consequently, refugees were in need of financial and spiritual assistance. This makes them more vulnerable to being influenced by recruiters who promised support and stability in exchange for adherence to certain ideologies and practices.

From another point of view, the second and third generations of Palestinians in France have not experienced life as refugees in camps. Language and identity are insufficient to bring them into the Palestinian mainstream. Palestinian fragmentation, individual allegiances and divergent interests have had a negative impact on the community. However, these factors still allow for a high degree of social connection and sense of belonging. Some of them do not see themselves as an integral part of the host country and distance themselves from the assimilation programmes. They continue to live in the host country without fully assimilating, a situation that causes them some degree of psychological trauma.

While both the first and second generations of immigrants legally have the same opportunities as ethnic Danes, in practice it is a different matter. They usually have to work twice as hard as Danes to secure the same opportunities, e.g. apprenticeships. Most immigrants never find an apprenticeship to get the maximum out of education, or find it later in the course of their lives. That is one of the reasons why some immigrants opt out of education. Community-level groups and networks can play a role in identity formation and may contribute to vulnerability to radicalisation. The sense of non-belonging is a very important factor for the Palestinian diaspora community in Denmark. Many Palestinians feel that they do not belong to Denmark. The role of media was referred to as important, because it usually creates the concept of 'otherness' that feeds the alienation of immigrants.

For Muslim communities in Greece, the most important risks are the poor levels of integration among second- and third-generation migrants, which is also linked with the absence of a legitimate and credible representative body for the Muslim community and the numerous unofficial mosques. Youngsters' identity crisis is another important risk factor for

radicalisation of diaspora communities in Greece. The environment and being surrounded by friends and family can definitely influence a youngster's life. Tensions between children and their families may lead young people to search for alternative environments of belonging, such as peers who in some cases are connected to activist organisations or radicalised individuals. "During adolescence, young people may pass through a period of uncertainty and confusion in which their sense of identity becomes insecure."

In Greece, an important dimension was the economic crisis and the marginalisation of an important section of the population. "Economic crisis in Greece has enhanced social exclusion; social and political marginalisation, the sense of despair and injustice contribute to radicalisation."

Vulnerability is also crucial for identity crisis and exploitation leading to radicalisation. Psychological traumas resulting from war violence that young refugees have suffered and a state of 'being on hold' after the experience of displacement can create feelings of resentment that may lead to radicalisation. This is particularly the case for unaccompanied minors in Greece.

The separation of religion from culture of origin that could lead Muslim diaspora communities to identify themselves as members of the global Islamic community (Ummah) was also a very important finding of the research on various diaspora communities.

The role of religion is an important dynamic of identity crisis within the Amazigh community in Spain. On the one hand, the general identity crisis has caused some to attach themselves to the clearest identity element that they possess: Islam. This occurs despite the fact that in many Amazigh communities Islam has traditionally had a cultural, rather than a religious role. In fact, for many members of the community, the Islamisation of the Amazigh in Europe has come along with Arabisation and the emergence of media channels from the Gulf.

Another important dimension is the identification of what is Islam in the eyes of Spaniards. A young female respondent remarked how she had to refrain from making her Muslim faith too obvious in order to avoid incessant questions and discrimination. Therefore, she chose not wear the hijab, although this meant she could not experience her spiritual life to the full in Spain. The hijab is an element that makes a difference for girls (something that does not happen with boys) and that can be recognised from a distance. She therefore felt she would not fit in with her social circle if she wanted to wear it.

Finally, some members of the community noted how their Arab/Muslim identity had been key in enhancing their employment prospects, since they worked in areas related to their language skills or cultural sensitivity (intercultural mediators, researchers on Moroccan politics or

Amazigh culture, etc.). However, they also remarked how this meant they were pigeonholed in the role of “Arab” or “Muslim” in the work environment, without having the chance to compete with their colleagues for management opportunities. For example, an intercultural mediator stated that she would like to be promoted within her office but this will never happen, since she is covering a position that would be difficult for a Spanish person to perform, whereas any other position can be filled by any other Spanish person. She found this frustrating in terms of her career development.

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the collapse of socialism, new freedoms relating to religious practice emerged. In socialist Yugoslavia, most Bosniaks only had formalistic knowledge about Islam. They were “cultural Muslims”, practising their religion according to behavioural traditions, but their overall lifestyle was very secular. People identified less as Muslims and more as proud Yugoslavs. After the war broke out, foreign Shiite and Sunni forces supported the Muslims in their struggle. While Shiite Islam was never able to gain a foothold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ideological influence from the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, grew. In the midst of the war, these foreign actors not only delivered humanitarian and financial aid, but also exerted an ideological influence with regard to the interpretation of religion. Existing structures of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina were denounced as un-Islamic; it was claimed that they were not the original way of Islam and were diluted with non-Islamic traditions. This caused a fundamental questioning of current religious behaviour. The younger generations were particularly susceptible to these new influences, causing an intergenerational conflict. This crisis of identity affected the diaspora as well as the population in the homeland and was prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s.

One interviewee experienced the radicalisation trajectory of a previously moderate religious individual who became extremely religious in a very short period of time since the start of the Syrian war, taking up an Islamic ideology that condemned the way in which Islam was practised in the community as un-Islamic and suddenly rejecting the community. The main feature of the newly adopted ideology of this radicalised individual is described as excludability of beliefs and worldviews that differ from his own. Community actors saw this individual rarely during this period due to his dismissive attitude towards the community. When their paths crossed, the community was accused of conveying the wrong values. Over a period of around 10 years, this radicalised individual made multiple trips to BiH and Syria. More recently, a normalisation of ideology in this individual could be observed and he even apologised to the community and the imam.

The final element that is very important for identity crisis is discrimination (whether real or perceived), i.e. the feeling of stigmatisation and marginalisation. This perception can be a source of frustration that may contribute to identity crises. Some victims of perceived

discrimination (particularly religious minorities) may react with aggression, including political violence.

Discrimination against the Amazigh community, and a perception that anything Arab is superior, contributes to identity crisis. Furthermore, for those who grew up in Morocco, their contact with Amazigh culture, language and history has been reduced to the family and friendship group. On the one hand, this has made them question their identity. In the eyes of most Spaniards, Moroccans are Arabs or Muslims (most people do not know about Amazigh culture). As a result, depending on the context, they have to refer to themselves as Arabs, although none of them identify with the Arab culture. On the other hand, some have made an effort to enhance their Amazighness by researching their cultural roots, learning the language properly and joining organisations that promote a sort of renaissance of the Amazigh culture. They remark how this lack of knowledge about their own culture and identity has become a significant vulnerability factor, since it leaves a void that can easily be filled by extremist ideologies.

Most members of the Amazigh community in Spain remarked how racism and Islamophobia are present in Spain and Europe. Those who migrated from Morocco explained how they suffered from exclusion and blatant discrimination. This made some respondents question their decision to come to Spain or their ability to integrate economically and socially in the country. In most cases, it was only because they came across local associations, NGOs or other members of the Amazigh/Moroccan community that they found the will to keep trying. In fact, some respondents commented on stigmatising and discriminatory measures against Muslims, which also represent another kind of Western radicalisation. However, this does not receive the same attention and is not embraced by the media and the political institutions.

It was also remarked that diasporas are concentrated in the suburbs, which are generally poor and neglected areas, making communication with other communities difficult. Only those who have the chance to go to university or can afford certain activities in the city centre are able to move away from these areas. All respondents pointed out that this kind of social exclusion is definitely a risk factor.

Instances of Islamophobia are present in poor areas such as Tallaght (Dublin) and social deprivation is a risk factor for Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland. The perception of discrimination and the feeling of injustice are also risk factors for the Palestinian communities in Denmark (i.e. they perceive some legislation, such as the law on the niqab, as discrimination and unjust action by the government).

The experience of discrimination among Bosniak individuals in Germany is more related to a generalised Islamophobia than to their country of origin. Members of the communities have

experienced instances of rejection in the job market, in their search for apartments and other fields of life as soon as they revealed that they were Muslims. According to the interviewees, Islamophobia in Germany has increased since 2015, leading to a reluctance to be visible as a Muslim in public. Women in particular are often exposed to discrimination when they wear a headscarf. Interviewees report assaults against female community members who wear a headscarf.

Women are exposed to push factors for religious radicalisation. When living in conservative and extremely patriarchal family contexts, this can lead them to seek self-expression elsewhere.

“It seems like women have less to lose and more to win through breaking out of patriarchal family structures. Nevertheless, more research needs to be done to prove this connection as the up-to-date evidence that exists is mainly anecdotal.”

Previous research shows that for men, push factors are more relevant. Concepts of masculinity that are propagated in radical ideologies lead men to feel inclined to join extremist networks. Absent fathers play an important role in attachment to hierarchical structures and radical milieus, as the structure can replace the absent father figure. But men also have much to gain by breaking out of violent and patriarchal family structures and emancipation of women and emancipation of men are always interconnected.

2.2 International geopolitics and military interventions/perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy

Another source of diaspora communities’ radicalisation is Western foreign policy, especially Western interventions in predominantly Muslim countries. A central component of the ideology of violent jihad is the notion that Islam is under mortal threat, so every good Muslim should fight in this battle between good and evil. This myth is reproduced in the form of intensive propaganda among young people who have the desire to act and seek the "solution" to the injustices and threats that Islam is experiencing. A radical belief is that there is a structural conflict between Islam and the West. In the latter stages, when the ideological pressure acquires political characteristics, the feeling that the Western powers have conspired against Islam is formed, sparking a desire and determination to restore the Caliphate in order to unite all Muslims in one government under the law of Islam. This is the main argument put forward by ISIS, which triggered the wave of European "foreign fighters”.

The transition from the pre-radicalisation phase to that of substantial radicalisation is influenced by several key parameters, the most common of which are:

- Western countries' foreign policy and the deliberate isolation of countries' actions
- The glory of jihad and violent activism, with anger directed against the actions of Western countries

Their perception of Western foreign policy in conjunction with its propagandistic exploitation by fanatics played a major role in cultivating anger in the younger Muslim generations. The military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the images from Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay and broadcasts from war zones such as Chechnya, Gaza, Somalia and Sudan convey the impression of ill-treatment and persecution of Muslims.

The West is perceived as a monolithic supporter of Israel and non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, including those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but also Pakistan in the past. Additionally, the West is blamed for not taking action in Kashmir and Chechnya.

A typical example is the London suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan, who in his statement explaining his motivation emphasised his belief in the crimes committed by the West against Muslims all over the world. Khan's partner, Shehzad Tanweer, videotaped a message, released a year after the London attack, in which he blamed British foreign policy for their actions and claimed that the attacks would continue until the British forces withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq (Bergen-Reynolds, 2005).

Koinova (2011) focuses on events in the homeland and finds that an emotional response among conflict-generated diasporas who view it as a solution to address past injustices may play an important role in diaspora radicalisation. Once diasporas are mobilised, the perpetration of grave violations of human rights in the homeland is likely to have a strong radicalising impact on diaspora politics (Haider, 2015). The identity of conflict-generated diasporas is often tied to collective trauma – and serious abuses can trigger fear, anger and threat to their collective identity. The Israeli bombing of Gaza, for example, triggered a large-scale mobilisation of the Palestinian diaspora (Haider, 2015).

The negative effects of global events have the potential to attract young people to extremist organisations (Abbas and Siddique, 2012). Whine (2009), for example, finds that political events in other countries (e.g. incidents in Kashmir and Palestine, the Iraq War, genocide of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina) have been a driving force in activating Muslim political engagement and recruitment by Islamist groups. Abbas and Siddique (2012) highlight that the frustrations of those perpetrating violent acts can be exacerbated when blame is placed solely on religion, neglecting these political issues. Menkhaus (2009) notes that while issues and events in the Middle East have been critical in radicalising Muslim diasporas of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, they may not resonate as much with African Muslim diaspora

groups. Instead, these groups are more likely to share grievances related to treatment of Muslims in the West generally post-9/11 (Haider, 2015).

Results of polls conducted among Muslims support a two-factor model in which seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam is predicted by both perceived discrimination and grievance related to Western foreign policy (McCauley, 2018). Consistent with this model, UK practitioners in counter-radicalisation programmes find it useful to recognise Muslim grievances related to Western foreign policy in order to argue that violence does not reduce Muslim suffering (McCauley, 2018). These observations indicate that Muslim grievances relating to Western foreign policy are important for understanding and countering support for jihadist violence in Western countries (McCauley, 2018).

David Betz (2008) summarised the jihadist narrative developed from a review of jihadist texts.

(1) Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the United States;
(2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as “terrorists”, are defending against this attack;
(3) The actions they take in defence of Islam are proportionally just and religiously sanctified; and, therefore
(4) It is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.

As Mueller (2018) notes, religion enters the narrative only insofar as caring about what happens to Muslims, caring about Muslims as victims of Western attack, justifies defensive or revenge violence.

For Bosniak diaspora communities in Germany, the role of the West in the war is an important parameter. During the Bosnian war, it was perceived as unjust by the Bosniak population and the diaspora that the UN issued an arms embargo while the Serbian side had access to the Yugoslav armoury, leading to a deliberate disadvantage from the perspective of the Bosniak side.

“Muslims in BiH needed any kind of help during the war in order to safeguard their bare survival.”

In this context, Muslim countries, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in particular, responded by sending support to the Muslim population in the Western Balkans. This support was implemented through humanitarian and financial aid and it also disseminated a religious ideology that was very different and much more radical than the Ottoman-coloured Islam predominant among the Muslim population at the time.

Extremist propaganda portrays the war in Bosnia as an attack by the West on the Islamic world, thereby establishing a direct connection to Islamist ideology in the interpretation of the conflict (cf. Hantscher 2014).

Most members of the Amazigh community in Spain are critical towards the situation in their homeland (Morocco). Many even stated that the Kingdom of Morocco does not represent anything but oppression for them and how being linked to it makes them feel rejection and shame. In fact, most respondents remarked that they have a positive image of Spain, since they enjoy more rights here than in Morocco. However, they are also very critical of Western policies towards Morocco, starting with the lack of freedom of movement of people between their country of origin and the European Union. Lack of freedom of movement and bureaucracy were listed as the main issue this community faces in Spain. For one respondent, the issue of visas as a whole (most applications are rejected) has turned into a lucrative business for the EU. All respondents remarked how in relations between the EU and Morocco, European economic and security interests prevail and a lack of attention to human rights in Morocco stands out. Some respondents considered that Morocco's international agreements with the United States or Israel concerning Western Sahara or Palestine may be a source of conflict with Europe and Algeria.

For the Palestinian diaspora communities in France and Denmark, Western support for Israel is a very important factor that can produce radicalisation.

“From the events of September, the gap began. At the same time, the Intifada took place. Sympathy was given to the victims of America, not Palestine. Negative thinking began to show extremism against Islam and Islamophobia spread.”

Also, they refer to Western policies, especially in the case of Syria, as an attempt to divide the Arab world and as a military intervention leading to the killing of thousands of Muslims in their own countries.

“A conspiracy against the Arab world to divide it, and they succeeded in some areas. With regard to Syria, the West shipped armies in the thousands and killed us in our own country.”

2.3 Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state actors

Engagement by state and non-state organisations in the home country can play a role in shaping the position of diaspora groups. In some countries, political Islam has tended to operate through non-violent political channels and to veer away from intolerant extremism (Sirseloudi, 2012).

From the point of view of the Bosniak diaspora community in Germany, two types of networks (community and war veteran networks) are the most important non-state actors in terms of linkages and engagement with the home country. The official Islamic authority in BiH excludes more radical ideologies, resulting in the formation of enclaves and congregations with Salafi jihadi ideology that are not supervised by the official Islamic authority. Located in BiH and Sandžak, predominantly Salafi jihadist villages and enclaves exist that are not overseen by the Bosnian Islamic authority and are isolated from the rest of society. This leads to major knowledge gaps about the individuals who are involved in violent extremist networks, the identity of the recruiters, and the connections between members of the diaspora and individuals abroad. Most of the regions where these congregations are located are socially and economically marginalised. As these congregations are excluded from government funding, private organisations, such as charitable foundations from the Gulf (rather than state actors), come in as donors. This solidifies the influence exerted by external actors and increases the rift with the mainstream Islamic community in the country.

Here, even jihadist training camps are offered. These training camps are important spaces for indoctrination in Salafi jihadist ideology and for learning the practical skill set needed for violent struggle, such as handling weapons and explosives. Nevertheless, spending time in a training camp cannot be seen as a direct causal factor for joining a violent extremist network or organisation. There are examples of individuals who underwent weapons training during vacations in the country of origin in their youth; they then came back to Germany with a latent network that they did not activate at first. They did not join a violent extremist organisation until they had made several trips to the camp. This is an example of how regions where Salafi jihadist congregations have de facto territorial control pose a latent risk of radicalisation as this can have an influence on individuals in Germany.

German Salafi jihadist organisations like “The True Religion” (Die wahre Religion) and successor organisations are well connected with their counterparts in BiH and there is a great deal of contact between these German-based organisations and jihadi networks located in the Western Balkans. A large community with Bosnian roots lives in Austria and radical individuals with a Bosnian background in Germany are often connected to their Austrian counterparts. For example, individuals based in Germany are known to have travelled to Austria to visit the well-known Salafi jihadist preacher Ebu Tejma and were radicalised there under the influence of jihadist networks from the Balkans.

Individuals who were previously involved in fighting in a conflict that is interpreted as jihad are respected for their experience and credibility and can exert influence on radicalised individuals in Germany. One example is Egyptian-German Reda Seyam. He came to Germany as a refugee and moved to BiH in 1994 where he joined mujaheddin forces and produced

propaganda videos glorifying their cause. He was accused of having been involved in an attack in Bali in 2002 which killed 202 people. The German Federal Criminal Police Office returned him to Germany where he continued to be involved in Salafi jihadist groups and produced propaganda before travelling to Syria to join ISIS in 2013. He was killed in Iraq in 2014. During his time back in Germany, he was never charged for his previous violent extremist activities abroad.

For Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland, the issue of imams and mosques is the most important domain where we can identify engagement with state and non-state actors from home countries. Some communities (e.g. Bosnian) bring in their religious interpretations/practices/worldviews and have their own mosques/places of prayer. This is connected to the tradition that one goes to the same imam the family goes to; there is a vulnerability element of needing to remain faithful to the family/home country imam. In addition, there is no official body in Ireland that guarantees that imams have the necessary qualifications from relevant bodies to be able to hold prayers and not to teach radical versions of Islam. This means that some are inclined to radical versions of Islam, and this is a vulnerability factor.

“This is a challenge. Absolutely. So, what happens is people who come to these mosques to pray, they also get their religious education there, but mostly the people that are there in the position of giving them the education are not qualified themselves. And people often get religious teachings that are not authentic. And they would assume since they heard it in the masjid [Arabic word for mosque] that it must be true. But it happens that the person who is teaching them doesn't even have qualifications in that field. And this is, this is how most people get radicalised.”

Another perception comes from the Amazigh community in Spain. All respondents remarked that they have no commitment to the Kingdom of Morocco since they see it as an oppressor of the Amazigh community. Therefore, they rarely find state or non-state organisations that can represent their interests and values. Some of them mentioned cultural entities, local Amazigh associations and the Herak movement, which led the revolt against the Moroccan government in the Rif region. Another example is an NGO that commits to causes that affect women in Morocco and supports single mothers.

For the Palestinian diaspora communities in France and Denmark, the linkages with the home country are part of their identity and very important for their high level of politicisation. Palestinians have a deep sense of nostalgia and pain due to the injustices they have suffered. The implementation of the long-overdue right of return is a constant and daily reminder. They tenaciously preserve and hold on to their culture and identity. Members of the Palestinian community share common interests such as a sense of national belonging, history, culture,

traditions and a common language. A considerable number of Palestinians see themselves and the diaspora as part of a resistance strategy against Israel.

2.4 Role of the Internet/social media and dissemination of radical propaganda

In the 1990s and 2000s, the younger generation of Bosniaks in Germany were very skilled in disseminating emerging conservative religious narratives through relevant media (CDs, MP3, new Internet messaging services). The older generation in the diaspora tends to be reached through conservative channels, such as mosques and sermons. Mosques and religious communities did not recognise the zeitgeist and were therefore unable to counter and compete with radical narratives distributed through new media as they lacked the literacy to utilise these newer platforms.

A similar development can be observed more recently since jihadist propaganda is very prominently disseminated via the Internet and is also identified as a space where the communities still cannot compete. The anecdotal evidence about radicalised individuals hints at the Internet as the platform where radical narratives are distributed and consumed.

Propaganda becomes relevant when it is displayed in a language that members of the diaspora feel comfortable with, i.e. German or English, and when role models are portrayed that recruits can identify with. ISIS also created role models for women, which did not exist before.

Here, the level of education of the imam becomes crucial. As religious role model and teacher in his congregation, he must be equipped to address questions and discontent expressed by the community members, and especially young people. If the imam is not able to provide answers to ambiguities or react to criticism and doubts in a convincing way that is based on profound theological knowledge, community members look for answers elsewhere. Nowadays, the most relevant source of information is the Internet and social media. Radicalisation entrepreneurs are specifically targeting individuals who are looking for answers through propaganda online. There are two to three “star preachers” in BiH who disseminate their radical sermons and messages online via videos and texts. Via the Internet, this content is directly accessible to members of the diaspora.

“While the Bosniak community was the exclusive source of affirmation for the older generations, in the younger generation of Bosniak diaspora nowadays, there is less willingness to engage in empathetic volunteer work. Motivations are more self-serving and people are more active in the online space; they might get their affirmation there instead of through concrete activities. These days, Islamic communities must be well-suited to compete in this environment.”

"Religious communities that promote openness experience hostility and defamation by more conservative and radical actors online."

These actors need to be equipped to keep up with the discourse in the online sphere in order to remain credible for younger people. This is often not the case.

For Muslim diaspora communities in Greece, cyberspace, especially social media, plays an important role in terms of networking, recruitment and vulnerability to propaganda. Furthermore, the online dimension of violence and abuse among teenagers and young adults incorporates components that change cultural and social norms. The daily interaction with violence in video games, movies, comics, etc. creates a sense of violence as normality.

Many interviewees from the Palestinian diaspora in France and Denmark describe the Internet as a main factor of radicalisation, primarily through the spread of negative images of Islam and Muslims.

The role of social media in the spread of propaganda is an important risk factor, according to the Amazigh community in Spain. Some remarked on the significance of social media in the dissemination of radical propaganda and particularly the role of Riffian imams and preachers who are spreading this kind of propaganda in their local language through the Paltalk platform.

Finally, the role of social media as a driver of radicalisation has been identified as a factor in rural communities in Ireland.

"I think isolation can definitely add to that, when people don't feel like they can associate or relate to someone in their local area. In Dublin there is a lot of discussion, whereas I think in the West in terms of the support that young people or communities are given, those conversations aren't necessarily there. And I think rural communities don't have facilities and resources to be able to do that, so people turn, definitely turn, to social media."

2.5 External influence of state and non-state actors

In the course of the collapse of Soviet Union and the war in BiH, actors from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states delivered humanitarian aid but also exerted an ideological influence. Consequently, a crisis of Islamic identity emerged. During the period of socialist Yugoslavia, most people were "cultural Muslims": they lived highly secular lifestyles, most women did not wear headscarves, and religious practice was coloured by and intertwined with other non-Islamic traditions.

In the midst of this very limited theological knowledge, influence from Saudi Arabia resulted in the questioning of traditional religious behaviour, causing a crisis of Muslim identity. The younger generation was particularly impacted by Saudi Arabian influence and this caused a clash between the generations.

Saudi Arabia exerted influence mainly through two channels. On the one hand, they provided financial assistance, and on the other hand, they picked charismatic personalities as multipliers who were invited to study in Saudi Arabia and questioned the existing Islamic structures in BiH after their return. The younger generation was especially susceptible to such influences, and puritanical Islamic narratives were disseminated through media such as CDs, MP3s and emerging messaging services on the Internet.

These actors continue to exert influence nowadays, but it is much less prominent than during the 1990s and 2000s. The impact is identified as marginal by one interviewee as the third and fourth generations of Bosniaks who were born and grew up in Germany show much less interest in radical narratives of Islam and are socialised mainly in the context of mainstream German society.

Many Palestinians in France and Denmark are outside or on the fringes of militant structures. Palestinian engagement is not unified but fragmented. A decline in support for the PLO and a rise in the popularity of Islamist organisations can be observed. This leads to repercussions due to the lack of agreement and coordination and increase in demands. The Palestine mission in France does not encourage the emergence of strong communities and has difficult relations with some. The assessment of influence from state and non-state actors fluctuated during interviews and is reflected in the speech on KSA or Qatar.

In the case of the Amazigh in Spain, the main external influence remarked upon was the role of social media and satellite TV in spreading a vision that respondents would not consider originally theirs. For example, they remarked how in Europe most Amazigh women started following Salafi practices in their daily religious life, when this was not a thing back home in Morocco. There is a general tendency to prove who is the purest Muslim, since some respondents commented on how they are reprimanded by family members on things they have always done that might now be haram according to these Saudi preachers.

Furthermore, some respondents remarked on the way in which non-governmental organisations coming from the Gulf and working in Europe hide certain political agendas that favour jihadi Salafism. Some explained how in certain town markets, organisations that claim to support Palestinian refugees or other Muslim victims are actually collecting money for other uses and trying to spread their version of Islam amongst women who go to the market.

2.6 Linkages with foreign terrorist fighters or other radicalised persons

According to Mendelsohn, the analysis of the "foreign fighter" phenomenon should not be limited to the current definition, meaning individual Muslims who are identified as belonging to jihadist terrorist organisations around the world. "Foreign fighters" have historically taken part in conflicts based on their choice of nationality, religious identity, but also ideology. To support this approach, Mendelsohn focuses on two reference cases for the emergence of "foreign fighters" in the modern world: a) the Spanish Civil War and b) the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Mendelsohn, 2011).

The strategic choice of using "foreign fighters" was expected to be a priority for globalised terrorist networks. States find it difficult to enter the process of systematically exploiting the "foreign" factor because of its unpredictable and differentiated nature, but also the increased costs and time that would be required for their training and integration into the organised military formations of the states. In contrast, "foreign fighters" are found mainly in asymmetrical conflicts in which at least one side is a non-state actor and usually a revolutionary force. In these cases, where conflicts involve surprise attacks and the use of small arms, the usefulness of volunteers, even with limited training and combat experience, is clearly greater. The current variant of Islamist "foreign fighters" stems from a similar process of revolutionary action, the Afghan resistance to the Soviets in the 1980s (Burke, 2003).

Islamist "foreign fighters" did not first appear in the war zones of Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, from the period of Afghanistan's resistance to the Soviets onwards, this is a phenomenon which has been evolving over time. What draws the spotlight in the case of the "foreign fighters" who have joined ISIS is their widespread deployment on the battlefield, a point that differentiates them significantly from their other uses by Islamist organisations in the past. However, in order to fully approach this phenomenon, we must take into account Mendelsohn's observation of its multidimensional nature: "A life cycle that starts when an individual begins to think about joining a conflict taking place in a foreign country, continues with his participation in the battle and ends with his actions when he leaves the battlefields" (Mendelsohn, 2011).

This observation, based on this author’s thorough research into the phenomenon of Islamist "foreign fighters", establishes an important parameter for the systematic study and analysis of the dangers posed by ISIS fighters. If we look beyond any initial surprise at the number of "foreign fighters", especially Europeans, we will find that these people are potential multipliers of violence when they leave the battlefields. They include veteran jihadists, equipped with practical knowledge of warfare, training, recruitment, use of the media and, in particular, social media for the transmission of propaganda, and the manufacture of

explosives, meaning that they are capable of transferring the field of conflict back to their homelands (Mendelsohn, 2011).

Another important dimension is the evolutionary nature of the role and influence of "foreign fighters". Trends in the development of the phenomenon are closely linked to variables such as the evolution of technology, social norms, the political climate and the prevailing dogmas for dealing with and preventing terrorist action. Their role, as confirmed by the developments themselves, is closely linked to the changes in global Islamist terrorism, especially since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Iraq was the turning point in the development of both global jihadism and the "foreign fighters" phenomenon. It is worth noting that the presence of US troops in Iraq has created a reverse momentum of "foreignness" for radicalised Islamists worldwide. The "foreign fighters" who wanted to fight in Iraq perceived the Americans as "foreign" invaders. Therefore, the motive for their involvement was not the battle in a foreign homeland, but the defence of their historic homeland against the invaders (Hegghammer, 2006).

The difference between the traditional "foreign fighters" and the "foreign fighters" of the younger generation is also important. The first generation of Islamist "foreign fighters" focused on the implications of their involvement in guerrilla warfare in the context of a particular conflict, while the second sees the battle as a place of sacrifice and action, as a tool for the violent transfer of political incentives. In this case, we can speak of a substantial shift from the battlefield as a final destination to the battlefield as part of a broader process of violent radicalisation.

Stephanie Kaplan argues that the "foreign fighter" phenomenon should be analysed at three levels which correspond to the phases of the life cycle of the fighters themselves. In the first phase, i.e. pre-transition on the battlefield, the emphasis is on the motivations, which are primarily ideological, and on the factors and people who shape the final choice of the transition, but also the transformation from 'sympathiser' to 'fighter' (Kaplan, 2009). In the second phase, i.e. the war phase, the questions concern their training, their operational roles and their general involvement in the armed conflict. The analysis of the third and final phase of the life of the "foreign fighter", i.e. the post-conflict period, is related to his subsequent action, from the moment he leaves the battlefield (Mendelsohn, 2011).

Mendelsohn identifies a number of areas in which the evolution of the Islamist "foreign fighter" phenomenon needs to be analysed in order to be able to design effective prevention and response policies:

Their place in the war hierarchy and on the battlefields: It is difficult for "foreign fighters", especially Westerners, to adapt effectively to battle tactics, but also to the wider culture of the area where they are deployed. There are a few cases where Western "foreign fighters" have managed, mainly thanks to some of their special abilities, to occupy a distinct position on the battlefield and in their organisations' actions. Typical cases are "Jihadi John" (Mohammed Emwazi) in ISIS and Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, a young "foreign fighter" from Alabama who played a leading role in al-Shabaab in Somalia (Roggion, 2013).

Their use as terrorists and planners of terrorist attacks: An important parameter is the use, mainly of Western "fighters" and especially of women and minors, as "fighters", not in the traditional sense of the word, but as terrorists or planners and supporters of terrorist attacks. There is a distinction here between those who are considered expendable and are used as suicide bombers and those who are trained to carry out major attacks, such as 9/11 and attacks on European capitals, without exposing themselves to imminent danger. In these cases, we are talking mainly about "foreign fighters" of Al-Qaeda who returned and used their European passports as a comparative advantage.

Their use as carriers of knowledge: One of the most effective functions of "foreign fighters" who have left the battlefields is to diffuse and transfer their operational knowledge. Typical cases are the transfer of knowledge from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan initially, but also to Somalia, Algeria, Yemen and Libya later.

Their use as recruiters: In the 1990s, "foreign fighters" who returned home or simply left the battle became the most effective second-generation conscripts to have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 21st century. These former "fighters", who were experienced in propaganda, have a comparative advantage in approaching excluded and angry young people whom they can radicalise and turn into "foreign fighters" using their personal stories and experiences.

Their utilisation for the media: One area in which "foreign fighters", especially Westerners, are being exploited is in the image game and in the creation of media content – an important part of Islamic State propaganda. Their participation is multifaceted and ranges from the preparation of statements and messages and the production of audiovisual material to the translation of messages into English and other languages; they also participate in videos in order to reinforce propaganda and fear.

ISIS focused its recruitment strategy on vulnerable individuals, a shift in the recruiting pool compared to Al-Qaeda. ISIS recruited foreign fighters from among petty criminals, which offers advantages for both sides: the recruits receive absolution for their previous life and the

recruiting violent extremist organisation gains people with capabilities that are relevant for its purposes, such as theft and handling weapons and even explosives. Additionally, the recruits know how to hide in the "underground".
In contrast, ideologically radicalised individuals can be spotted easily by security agencies.

Additionally, individuals with a criminal record who are recruited as foreign fighters are more interesting for organised crime organisations after returning from their jihadist activities abroad, as they have often completed training camps and obtained important skills that enable them to carry out criminal activities successfully.

Members of the Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland who went to fight as FTFs were second-generation migrants and refugees, so this was stressed as a generational issue. Furthermore, the role of war veterans and solidarity were emphasised as important factors, particularly in contact offline.

"I think those who are veterans do more offline [radicalisation]. Okay. It's not because they are too old because most of them are under 50, under 45. But there's only so much you can do online; you have bonds, and fraternities, and belonging and co-victimisation plays a role. So shared experiences of war bring people together."

Connections with FTFs or radicalised persons were mentioned by some interviewees. They present many enrolled youths in ISIS in spite of themselves, they went for humanitarian work and saw themselves blocked there.

Some respondents stated that they themselves had connections with radicalised individuals. One respondent described the case of a friend from Morocco who experienced a process of radicalisation in groups associated with a mosque in France. According to this respondent, the friend let himself be influenced because he was young, alone and feeling lost in a different country and was seeking some kind of reference point. Another case reported involved a young Moroccan immigrant who arrived in Spain as a child and had difficulty finding his place in Spanish society. He reportedly suffered from discrimination and lost all hope, so he decided to go to Syria and join ISIS. He died in the war.

Finally, for the Muslim diaspora communities in Greece, the risk of possible exploitation of migration flows for the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters was important. The risk increased during the refugee/migration crisis due to the influx of new arrivals. Youth returnees from ISIS (i.e. young people who travelled to fight for ISIS in Syria) were particularly important as they were able to make use of the refugee/migrant flows in Greece. These people have undergone intensive paramilitary training, have been involved in murders and

battlefield/terrorist attacks and are victims of violence and propaganda – factors which, if combined with loss of hope, may lead to a new cycle of violence.

3 Resilience factors

This section outlines key findings about resilience factors. According to the literature, the aim of protective interventions is to encourage community and religious leaders to take steps to monitor and counter radicalisation processes within their communities (Whine, 2009). Curtis and Jaine (2012) highlight arguments that diasporas should be viewed not solely in terms of potential social problems but rather as important resources and ideal subjects for initiatives in relationship-building. Ranstorp and Hyllengren (2013) emphasise that women can play an important role in preventing extremism. They argue that Muslim women should not be seen as silent victims, but rather as potential influential advocates of anti-extremist measures. Finally, some experts emphasise the importance of developing credible counter-narratives to those of radical and extremist groups (Schmid, 2013; Parent and Ellis, 2013).

The outcome of this research was the development of the concept of resilient communities as the main driver for prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism within diaspora communities. Resilience refers to the process of overcoming the negative effects of risk exposure, coping successfully with traumatic experiences, and avoiding the negative trajectories associated with risks (Fergus- Zimmerman, 2005). Researchers have identified three models of resilience – compensatory, protective and challenge – that explain how promotive factors operate to alter the trajectory from risk exposure to negative outcome (Fergus-Zimmerman, 2005). A compensatory model is defined when a promotive factor counteracts or operates in an opposite direction of a risk factor. A compensatory model therefore involves a direct effect of a promotive factor on an outcome. Another model of resilience is the protective factor model. In this model, assets or resources moderate or reduce the effects of a risk on a negative outcome. A third model of resilience is the challenge model. In this model, the association between a risk factor and an outcome is curvilinear. This suggests that exposure to low levels and high levels of a risk factor are associated with negative outcomes, but moderate levels of the risk are related to less negative (or positive) outcomes.

Social connection is at the heart of resilient communities and suggests that any strategy to increase community resilience must both harness and enhance existing social connections while endeavouring to not damage or diminish them (Ellis and Abdi, 2017). Three types of social connections are critical to a resilient community in relation to violent extremism (Ellis and Abdi, 2017). First, social connections within and between communities specifically

mitigate risk factors associated with violent extremism; within communities refers to individuals that share similar social identities (termed social bonding), and between communities refers to groups composed of individuals with diverse social identities but who share a common sense of community in some other way (termed social bridging). Second, the role of social connection between communities and institutions or governing bodies (termed social linking) provides an opportunity for addressing social injustice and building structures for intervention with youths who start down that path. Finally, CBPR, a model of community engagement and partnership in research, provides a roadmap for how to enhance these types of social connection and build resilient communities (Ellis and Abdi, 2017).

RAN (2018) provides a set of protective factors as part of the general resilience to violent extremism concept:

1. To protect against political alienation, focus on democratic citizenship.
2. To protect against apocalyptic ideology, offer religious knowledge.
3. To protect against identity crises, stimulate personal participation.
4. To protect against the pull of the extremist milieu, provide a warm and/or supported family environment.
5. To help individuals resist negative influences from friendship and kinship, cultivate autonomy and self-esteem.
6. To protect from (feelings of) exclusion, enhance social coping skills (RAN 2018).

3.1 Successful integration – engagement and cooperation between the host country and the communities

Successful integration was highlighted as the primary condition for a resilient community. Cooperating with other initiatives and organisations as well as with state institutions is an important factor. Ireland as a host country has initiated various engagement programmes with different communities to develop resilience against radicalisation. Apart from engagement programmes, some integration programmes have been devised after international incidents such as the 9/11 attacks, including the Garda Diversity programme. One example from Germany is a visiting schools programme to introduce the community and to convey to the children and teachers that representatives of Islamic congregations can function as positive role models. Religious responsibility is understood also as societal responsibility. For diaspora communities in Spain, the key lies in finding a balance between knowledge of the local culture and the culture of origin. In this sense, some respondents participated in activities within the Erasmus+ programme. They consider intercultural exchange and having experience of other cities and countries as something positive for the change of mindsets that can be linked to better integration.

In Greece, the Council of Europe and the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs run a programme which enables refugees to apply for a document known as the "European Qualifications Passport for Refugees". The programme was launched in 2017 and assists refugees who have lost the documents that certify their qualifications. Once the refugees' applications have been assessed, the Greek authorities issue them with a certificate that proves their higher education qualifications, work experience and language proficiency. The programme is intended to promote their professional and social integration.

Furthermore, the role of education in general is very important for integration. This applies particularly to school activities and courses that promote the principles of human rights and respect for other cultures and religions. The schools in Greece have already introduced relevant courses: "Environmental Education", "Social and Political Education", "Sexuality Education", "Health Education", etc. More specifically, the main courses in the schools' "Modern Greek" and "Greek Literature" programmes include components on respect for diversity and democratic values. Moreover, the English course has cultural elements. However, the most important change has occurred in "Religious Education": the schools have passed from a dogma dissemination approach to a comparative and historical approach. The projects in Greek schools encompass intercultural elements and democratic dialogue, transmitted through methods of role playing, simulation of the Greek parliament, debates, artistic activities with drama productions that empower democratic interaction, etc.).

A successful example of integration is the Palestinian community in France. This Palestinian community is clearly integrated, while at the same time many Palestinians in France are part of Palestinian activism, and maintain a special link to their identity. The community has spared no effort to establish an effective network to help build and organise a competent and active Palestinian and Arab community. The diaspora organisations are governed by members of the Palestinian diaspora and are geared towards the diaspora. The solidarity network associations are run by French activists.

It is important to highlight that many initiatives and projects are set up by German and Greek state and non-state institutions that focus on the integration of Muslim communities and prevention of radicalisation (i.e. intercultural training for public servants in Greece), but often these projects are developed and implemented in an ad hoc fashion and lack a long-term perspective.

3.2 Community cohesion programmes linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives

Increased social (community) cohesion builds relationships and reduces the marginalisation that can be a potential driver of VE (Mitchell, 2018). Haider (2009: 11) explains the logic behind

community-led approaches to integration: “The assumption is that participation in common projects, such as service delivery, livelihood and community development projects, and structured interaction among previously divided communities will help to reframe perceptions of the ‘other’, dispel negative myths and facilitate changes in perceptions and attitudes.”

In Ireland, some community cohesion programmes were initiated by the government and civil society organisations. These programmes aim to build collective community resilience against radicalisation. One example involves the National Youth Council of Ireland. This involvement is crucial and creates community cohesion spaces that break the process of silencing individuals, which is a driver of behaviours that might lead to radicalisation and extremism.

Another example comes from the Bosnian diaspora community in Germany. During the war, the Bosniak communities’ main activities were focused on supporting community members in coping with the difficult circumstances in Germany and back in BiH. The congregations were active in various fields: in addition to organising common religious practice, they gave practical support to people who had arrived as war refugees in Germany, provided spiritual guidance to process trauma, offered financial support and helped to organise administrative processes in the new country. Community members gathered on the weekends to spend time together and receive Islamic religious education and tutoring, as well as supplementary Bosnian school education.

While the challenges and needs of community members have changed since the 1990s and 2000s, many members of the Bosniak communities who experienced this kind of support during this time are now engaged in the community and are working to pass on this positive experience to the next generations. The experience of affirmation and providing positive role models, especially for young people, is carried on for the next generation. By now, the third and fourth generations of Bosniaks growing up in Germany are much better educated and integrated in German society than the older generations.

Through the organisation of community gatherings on weekends, cultural events such as literary evenings, Friday prayers, religion classes and Bosnian language classes, young community members are supported in positively affirming their Bosniak origins and embracing their identity as multidimensional. It is expected that better knowledge about Bosniak culture will prevent identity crises in individuals and assist them to confront discrimination. Part of this is also the establishment of a positive public image of the communities through collaboration with the media so that younger generations identify positively with these spaces and continue to consider them part of their lives in Germany.

In Spain, the members of the Amazigh diaspora participate in organising various activities that promote Amazigh culture and intercultural dialogue with the local community. They also point

out how important it is to expand the meeting spaces between the Spanish and Amazigh communities, mainly through culture and art. For the members of the Amazigh diaspora, the possibility of participating in activism and cultural activities for the Amazigh community has prevented those in vulnerable situations from losing hope or turning to extremism.

One example was the Hirak movement which supports Riffian activists who come to Spain to escape the brutality of the Moroccan government. Furthermore, the movement is working on raising awareness of the situation in the Moroccan Rif around Europe and denouncing human rights violations. As part of this, the movement was nominated for the Sakharov Prize in 2018. Another example is mentoring of unaccompanied minor migrants in the Basque region. The project involves helping these minors when they arrive and assisting them to navigate a new language and culture. Most importantly, it involves former unaccompanied minors who have managed to study, find a job and fulfil their expectations to become role models and inspire others.

Social cohesion is also a strategic objective of the “Aarhus Model” in Denmark. Local police officers, educators, social workers and mental health professionals work together to engage vulnerable individuals. Young people on the path to radicalisation to violence are partnered with mentors who have faced similar challenges. This programme, originally designed to deal with violent right-wing extremists, expanded its focus after the rise of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

In the case of Greece, participation of first-line practitioners in educational training, in raising awareness, in networks like RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network) and their cooperation with relevant professionals such as psychologists and social workers are key elements in prevention (early identification of signs of radicalisation, adjusted approach to radicalised youths and minors). Another example is the “Protecting Children in the Context of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe” programme, which aims to ensure that refugee and migrant children are provided with education. Education is also an important factor to promote social cohesion, especially for the most vulnerable youngsters and refugees. The integration of these groups is achieved by: special reception classrooms, enhanced courses for vulnerable students so that they can study the Greek language in depth as a second language, and special evening reception classrooms at Greek schools for young refugees who live in hotspots (the goal is the integration of these children into the regular morning classrooms).

3.3 Pluralistic inter-religion dialogue and initiatives to avoid the stigmatisation and separation of Islam from other religions

For diaspora communities in Germany, inter-religious dialogue is considered important but in order to be fruitful, it needs to be genuine and involve more than purely formalistic exchange. Inter-religious dialogue is a demanding practice as it entails pushing the boundaries of one’s

own convictions and trust-building. It may be useful to start to gather around topics of common interest from the perspective of different worldviews, such as the environment. While friendly and honest dialogue with German institutions is more advanced, dialogue between the various religious communities of Western Balkan origin remains a major challenge following the recent experience with violent conflict between these communities in the region.

For the Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland, inter-religious dialogue is an important factor/initiative for community resilience. For example, the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council challenges divisions theologically. The practice of inter-religious dialogue helps to bridge the gap between Irishness and being a Muslim in Ireland. The voices of other faith leaders empower their voices as it shows a way of co-existing in harmony. Another example comes from the Shia Community Centre, which makes rigorous efforts to hold various activities related to inter-faith dialogue. They include the "Understanding Islam" initiative which introduces Islam to people from other faiths and to Garda and other officials.

For diaspora communities in Spain, inter-religious dialogue is very important. The members of the community note how getting to know more about the other helps to build understanding and may contribute to preventing violent extremism. However, they note that it is normally the migrant community that makes the effort to get to know the local community, not the other way round. With regard to the city of Melilla (which is around 55% Amazigh/Muslim), it was noted that it is rare to find a Spanish person who has learned a word of Amazigh or has an interest in finding out more about the culture and religion of more than half of the population in the area. Thus, inter-cultural initiatives cannot work without genuine changes in local Spanish communities' attitudes towards other cultures and languages.

In Greece, over 100 schools are participating in a European network of schools under UNESCO. Many UNESCO activities are held in classrooms. Additionally, many teachers, who are chosen on the basis of qualitative criteria, participate in ERASMUS+ activities abroad in order to become multipliers of best practices after their return. Another important initiative is the intercultural training and awareness raising programme. The aim of this programme is to improve police officers' knowledge and understanding of migrants and different cultures, to develop communication skills in a multicultural environment and management of fragmented communication, to promote respect for human rights and cultural diversity, to empower police officers and other civil servants in effective engagement in multicultural workflow and combating discrimination, to raise awareness of intercultural communication and intercultural dialogue in law enforcement tasks, to prevent and resolve cultural crises and to improve understanding of the "Other" and of self-knowledge, critical thinking and abolition of stereotypes and prejudices.

3.4 Cooperation with the communities and engagement of credible and moderate voices

Community cooperation was a sub-factor that emerged during the discussion of integration programmes in Ireland. A very specific example is the “Safe Haven” training programme run by Dublin City Interfaith Forum. “Safe Haven” is an attempt to amplify credible voices as it works with religious leaders and members of different faith communities and specifically addresses the issue of religiously motivated hate crime. The cooperation with the communities and initiatives like “Safe Haven” also provide a resilient basis on which to understand the various factors of radicalisation and equip the participants with skills to respond to it. “Safe Haven” also has a reporting mechanism and provides victim support.

In Germany, the role of the imam is crucial for the interaction of Muslim communities with the government and other state and non-state institutions. In each Islamic congregation, the imam is the most important person as he interprets the faith. This interpretation influences the religious practice and belief system of the members of the congregation. The imam has three areas of responsibility: giving Friday sermons, leading prayer and teaching religion. The variables in these roles of responsibility are: how to convey religion to the next generation, how to convey religious practice to the community and how to act as a role model. The imam has a great deal of leeway in how he performs these roles. He is the key religious authority, influencing the community members’ lived religious practice. An in-depth theological education enables the imam to counter radicalising narratives from a theological angle. A well-educated imam is therefore key to preventing radicalisation of members of his congregation, including in diaspora communities.

For the Palestinian diaspora community in Denmark, the most important channel for communication is political participation at different governmental levels. For example, a member of the Palestinian diaspora founded the New Alliance Party in May 2007, when he became the first leader of a Danish party of foreign origin. Members of the Palestinian diaspora community have been elected to several municipal councils in Denmark (Aarhus, Ballerup, etc.).

3.5 Counter-narratives, use of social media

The role of media is seen as a very important resilience factor in Ireland as media reporting is perceived as responsible. Counter-narratives in Ireland have greatly challenged stereotypes and prejudice that people might have about different people within society, particularly when there is ignorance or a lack of understanding. One example is the Hijabs and Hat-tricks programme for young Muslim women who play football. It was set up in 2014 “to encourage young Muslim women to play football after FIFA had lifted the ban on the hijab”. This counter-narrative attracted a great deal of media attention and inspired RTE to create a radio drama

about "Being Muslim in Ireland". Counter-narratives also play a crucial role for resilience in the lives of people who are cognitively vulnerable to radicalisation. One example in the Irish context is the "Muslim Sisters of Eire" who send the message that "if you are young and want to fight in Syria, come and feed the homeless and there is no need to pick up a gun to help".

In the case of Germany, counter-narratives need to work against strict friend-foe worldviews and teach the value of heterogeneity and multi-perspective approaches. During the pandemic, sermons and messages were made available online. However, Bosnian-language content is not as interesting for the younger generation and older volunteer community workers are often not equipped to do professional social media outreach. This is nevertheless considered a decisive step in preventing the younger generations from detaching from the community, as counter-narratives need to be target-group-specific.

For the diaspora communities in Spain, social media play a positive role in resilience. The social media networks created by Amazighs in Morocco and in the diaspora are important in conveying information about the reality of their lives in Morocco and in the diaspora. Most importantly, these networks have also created a space to share historical and cultural findings that Amazigh individuals have made personally. For example, they share family stories and try to re-create history from the point of view of the Amazigh people (instead of the Moroccan or European point of view). This has allowed them to find a source of knowledge about their own culture and identity through social media.

For the diaspora communities in Greece, "counter-narrative" initiatives are considered important and must start from school in a bottom-up approach in order to limit extreme ideologies. In this sense, awareness-raising activities may be valuable for "bringing back" at-risk youths and minors into mainstream society. The Ministry of Education is responsible for promoting school activities and courses that support the principles of respect for human rights.

4 Gender

In both risk and resilience factors, the PAVE fieldwork research with diaspora communities in European countries shows that communities recognise that women play an essential role in the development of resilience initiatives and prevention and de-radicalisation initiatives. A community that promotes tolerance and inclusivity, and reflects gender equality norms, is stronger and less vulnerable to violent extremism. Not only does women's active participation in a diaspora community – formally or informally – strengthen its fabric, but women themselves are among the most powerful voices of prevention. Women can, uniquely, help

build the social cohesion, sense of belonging and self-esteem that young people may need to resist the appeal of a violent group. Community engagement in CVE requires the participation of women to be successful.

5 Conclusions

Identity crisis has been identified as one of the most important risk factors that can lead to violent extremism. In many of the terrorist attacks in various EU countries in recent years, we have observed the involvement of young second- or third-generation immigrants as perpetrators. Among the different stories and backgrounds of those individuals, we can emphasise the issue of identity crisis and, above all, the non-belonging phenomenon. An important form of identity crisis is when someone has difficulties in identifying in different spaces (i.e. the Amazigh Diaspora community in Spain). Young people's identity crisis plays a crucial role as a risk factor that could lead to radicalisation. This is usually linked with the sense of 'lack of belonging', an important factor when there is a situation of 'dual identity' (i.e. Muslim minorities in Ireland).

A really important risk factor stems from the different characteristics of the new generation of immigrants, especially refugees. The different types of migration influence these individuals' integration process. Individuals who left their country involuntarily as refugees and carry the trauma of war and displacement are generally more vulnerable mentally, economically and with regard to their legal status (i.e. the Bosniak community in Germany). The same perception also derives from the new generation of migrants and refugees in Ireland, with many new people arrived from war-torn regions with deep sectarian divisions, which may be seen as a factor that is relevant for the integration trajectory.
The issue of religious leaders is also important for the Muslim communities in Ireland. The factor of religion is generally linked with successful integration, since the absence of a legitimate and credible representative body for the Muslim community and the numerous unofficial mosques (e.g. in Greece) are conditions that lead to poor integration and risks of radicalisation. The separation of religion from culture of origin that may lead Muslim diaspora communities to identify themselves as members of the global Islamic community (Ummah) was also a very important finding in the research with different diaspora communities (e.g. Amazigh community in Spain).
The final factor that is very important for identity crisis is discrimination (whether real or perceived), the feeling of stigmatisation and marginalisation. For some communities (e.g. in Greece), an important dimension was the economic crisis and the marginalisation of significant sectors of the population. Vulnerability is also crucial for identity crisis and

exploitation to radicalisation. Finally, instances of Islamophobia linked with discrimination and stigmatisation are integral parts of the risk situation (e.g. in Germany and Ireland).

Another source of diaspora communities' radicalisation is Western foreign policy, especially Western interventions in predominantly Muslim countries. For Bosniak diaspora communities in Germany, the role of the West in the war is an important parameter (it was perceived as unjust). In general, extremist propaganda portrays the war in Bosnia as an attack by the West on the Islamic world, thereby establishing a direct connection to Islamist ideology in the interpretation of the conflict. Other fields of EU policy, such as freedom of movement from third countries, was also highlighted as a factor that creates the perception of a negative role of Western policies (Amazigh community in Spain). For the Palestinian diaspora communities in France and Denmark, the West's support for Israel is a very important factor that can produce radicalisation. Finally, the war in Syria was highlighted as the most important turning point.

Engagement by state and non-state organisations in the home country can play a role in the position of diaspora groups. In some countries, political Islam has tended to operate through non-violent political channels and to veer away from intolerant extremism. From the point of view of the Bosniak diaspora community in Germany, two types of networks (community and war veterans networks) are the main non-state actors in terms of linkages and engagement with the home country. German Salafi jihadist organisations like "The True Religion" (Die wahre Religion) and successor organisations are well connected with their counterparts in BiH and there is a great deal of contact between these German-based organisations and jihadi networks located in the Western Balkans. For Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland, the issue of imams and mosques is the most important domain where we can identify engagement with state and non-state actors from home countries. Some communities (e.g. Bosnian) bring their religious interpretations/practices/worldviews and have their own mosques/places of prayer. For the Palestinian diaspora communities in France and Denmark, the linkages with the home country are part of their identity and very important for their high level of politicisation. A considerable number of Palestinians see themselves and the diaspora as part of a resistance strategy against Israel.

Jihadist propaganda is very prominently disseminated via the Internet and is also identified as a space where the communities still cannot compete. Nowadays, the most relevant sources of information are the Internet and social media. Radicalisation entrepreneurs are specifically targeting individuals who are looking for answers by accessing propaganda online. There are two to three "star preachers" in BiH who disseminate their radical sermons and messages online via videos and texts. This content is directly accessible online to members of the diaspora. For Muslim diaspora communities in Greece and Spain, cyberspace, especially social media, plays an important role in terms of networking, recruitment and vulnerability to

propaganda. Many interviewees from the Palestinian diaspora in France and Denmark describe the Internet as a main factor of radicalisation, mainly through the spread of negative images of Islam and Muslims.

In the course of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in BiH, actors from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states delivered humanitarian aid but also exerted ideological influence. Consequently, a crisis of Islamic identity emerged. Influence by third countries was exerted mainly through two channels. On the one hand, they provided financial assistance, and on the other hand they picked charismatic personalities as multipliers who were invited to study in Saudi Arabia and questioned the existing Islamic structures. Many Palestinians in France and Denmark exist outside or on the fringes of militant structures. Palestinian engagement is not unified but fragmented. A decline in support for the PLO and a rise in the popularity of Islamist organisations were observed. In the case of Amazigh communities in Spain, social media and satellite TV were identified as the main external influence. Furthermore, non-governmental organisations coming from the Gulf and working in Europe promote certain political agendas that favour Salafi jihadism.

ISIS focused its recruitment strategy on vulnerable individuals, a shift in the recruiting pool compared to Al-Qaeda. ISIS recruited foreign fighters from among petty criminals, which offers advantages for both sides. Individuals with a criminal record who are recruited as foreign fighters are more interesting for organised crime organisations after returning from their jihadist activities abroad, as they have often completed training camps and gained skills in engaging successfully in criminal activities. Members of the Muslim diaspora communities in Ireland who went to fight as FTFs were second-generation migrants and refugees, so this was stressed as a generational issue. Furthermore, the role of war veterans and solidarity was highlighted as an important factor, particularly in contact offline. Finally, for the Muslim diaspora communities in Greece, the risk of possible exploitation of migration flows by foreign fighters was important. The risk increased during the refugee/migration crisis due to the influx of large numbers of new arrivals.

Successful integration was highlighted as the primary condition for a resilient community. Cooperation with other initiatives, organisations and state institutions is an important factor. Furthermore, the role of education is very important for integration, particularly school activities and courses that promote the principles of human rights and respect for other cultures and religions. Another important factor that can be linked to better integration is intercultural exchange and experience in other cities and countries. Some examples are the visiting schools initiative in Germany, the “Garda Diversity” programme in Ireland and the “European Qualifications Passport for Refugees”. Another form of integration is the social and political activism by the Palestinian diaspora in France, which is a good example of resilience.

Increased social (community) cohesion builds relationships and reduces the marginalisation that can be a potential driver of violent extremism. Community cohesion programmes have been initiated by the government and civil society organisations in various European countries. These programmes aimed to build collective community resilience against radicalisation. Examples are the National Youth Council of Ireland and activities that promote Amazigh culture and intercultural dialogue with the local community in Spain, mainly through culture and art. An important part of social cohesion is support for vulnerable populations and especially refugees and unaccompanied minors. One example is the support for Bosnian refugees in Germany, including spiritual guidance to process trauma, financial support and administrative or legal assistance. In addition, community members gathered on the weekends to spend time together and to receive Islamic religious education, tutoring and supplementary Bosnian school education. Another example is mentoring of unaccompanied minor migrants in the Basque region and "Protecting Children in the Context of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe" in Greece. The engagement of vulnerable individuals is also an integral part of the "Aarhus Model" in Denmark. Finally, education is an important factor in promoting social cohesion, especially for the most vulnerable youngsters and refugees.

For the Muslim diaspora communities, the interreligious dialogue is an important factor/initiative for community resilience. For example, the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council challenges divisions theologically. Inter-religion dialogue is also part of intercultural training and awareness raising programmes. One example from Greece is the intercultural training for police officers and public servants. The aim of this programme is to improve police officers' knowledge and understanding of migrants and different cultures, to develop communication skills in a multicultural environment and management of fragmented communication and to promote respect for human rights and cultural and religion diversity.

Community cooperation was a sub-factor that emerged during the field research with diaspora communities in Europe. A very specific example is the 'Safe Haven' training programme run by Dublin City Interfaith Forum. In Germany, the role of the imam is crucial for the interaction of Muslim communities with the government and other state and non-state institutions. Furthermore, for the Palestinian diaspora community in Denmark, the most important channel for communication is political participation at various levels of government.

The role of the media is seen as a very important resilience factor in Ireland as media reporting is perceived as responsible. Counter-narratives in Ireland have greatly challenged stereotypes and prejudice that people might have about different people within society, particularly when there is ignorance or a lack of understanding. One example is the Hijab and Hat-tricks programme for young Muslim women who play football. In the case of Germany, counter-narratives need to work against strict friend-foe worldviews, and teach the value of

heterogeneity and multi-perspective approaches. For the diaspora communities in Spain, social media play a positive role in resilience. The social media networks created by Amazighs in Morocco and in the diaspora were important conveying information about the reality of their lives in Morocco and in the diaspora. Finally, for the diaspora communities in Greece, "counter-narrative" initiatives are considered important and must start from school in a bottom-up approach in order to limit extreme ideologies.

6 Bibliography

Abbas, T. & Siddique, A. (2012). Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial city. Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 18(1), 119-134.

Armakolas, I. & Karatrantos, T. (2016). “Infiltration of terrorists in mixed migration flows”, in D. Phillips (ed.), Balkan Human Corridor: Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from Scholars and Opinion Leaders in Southeast Europe, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, New York.

Bergen, P. & Reynolds, A. (2005). Blowback revisited: Today’s Insurgents in Iraq are Tomorrows Terrorists, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84(6), November-December.

Betz, D. (2008). The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 19(4), 519–40.

Burke, J. (2003). Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, I.B. Tauris, London.

Curtis, S. & Jaine C. (2012). Public Diplomacy at Home in the UK: Engaging Diasporas and Preventing Terrorism, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7.

Duranovic, A. (2020). Identity Transformation of Migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in post-1960s Germany, Journal of the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, Vol. 7(2), 249-264.

Ellis, B. H. & Abdi, S. (2017). Building community resilience to violent extremism through genuine partnerships, American Psychologist, Vol. 72(3), 289–300.

Fergus, S. & Zimmerman, M. (2005). Adolescent resilience: a framework for understanding healthy development in the face of risk, Annual review of public health, Vol. 26. 399-419.

Haider, H. (2015). Radicalisation of Diaspora communities. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Hantscher, S. (2014). Externe Konflikte und Islamistische Radikalisierung. Eine Analyse zum Einfluss des Bosnienkrieges auf die islamistischen Radikalisierungsprozesse in Deutschland, Journal EXIT Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur, 2/2014.

Hegghammer, T. (2006). Global Jihadism after the Iraq War, Middle East Journal, Vol. 60(1).

Mendelsohn, B. (2011). Foreign Fighters – Recent trends, Orbis, Vol. 55(2).

Kaplan, S. (2009). The Jihad Effect: How Wars Feed the Global Jihadist Movement, Wilson Center.

Koinova, M. (2011). Diasporas and secessionist conflicts: the mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 34(2), 333-356.

McCauley, C. (2018). Explaining Homegrown Western Jihadists: The Importance of Western Foreign Policy, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2018.

Menkhaus, K. (2009). "African Diasporas, Diasporas in Africa and terrorist threats". In D. Zimmermann and W. Rosenau (eds.), The radicalisation of Diasporas and terrorism, pp. 83-109. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.

Mueller, J. (2018), ed. Terrorism since 9/11: The American Cases, N. p. The Educational Publisher.

Parent, R. B. & Ellis, J. O. (2011). Countering radicalisation of Diaspora communities in Canada. Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Diversity. Metropolis British Columbia, Burnaby and Vancouver.

Ranstorp, M. & Hyllengren, P. (2013). Prevention of violent extremism in third countries: measures to prevent individuals joining armed extremist groups in conflict zones. Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National Defence College.

Roggio, B. (2013). Shabaab kills American jihadist Omar Hammami and British fighter. The Long War Journal. A Project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague.

Spielhaus, R. & Nina, M. (2020). Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Berlin. Erlanger Zentrum für Islam und Recht in Europa (EZIRE).

Waldman, M. (2010). Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban. United Nations Institute of Peace, Washington.

Whine, M. (2009). The Radicalisation of Diasporas and Terrorism. United Kingdom, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, Issue 80.

Zimmermann, D. & Rosenau, W. (2009). The Radicalisation of Diasporas and Terrorism. United Kingdom, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, Issue 80.