



Toolkit on cross-regional vulnerability/resilience factors

Project Title: Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism through Community Resilience in the Balkans and MENA (PAVE)

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1 Introduction

One important objective of Work Package 6 is to analyse the impact of radicalisation leading to violent extremism on European security and to map the related risks and challenges. The risk map visualises transnational risk and resilience factors in two ways. The risk factors (disintegration, identity crisis, vulnerability to propaganda, etc.) and the resilience factors (integration, the role of credible voices, social media, education, intercultural dialogue, etc.), with a dedicated signal representing them, are the main parts of the map. The main connecting lines represent the main transnational implications.

The toolkit is based on other deliverables produced for the PAVE project: a [risk map](#) and a [comparative analysis report](#). By using the two broad sectors of risk and resilience factors, the toolkit provides a methodology and a two-step approach for effective use of the risk map: 1) risk assessment and 2) resilience assessment and mitigation plans. The toolkit also includes tips and suggestions for policy-makers and practitioners in order to enhance their abilities to establish prevention policies and resilience initiatives. An important part of the toolkit is the introduction of risk scenarios, which will help improve the use of risk and resilience frameworks.

2 How to Use the Toolkit

Who is this toolkit for?

This toolkit is intended for:

- Decision-makers and policy-makers with responsibilities for democratic governance;
- Public authorities responsible for social integration, social cohesion, policing, security and education;
- Practitioners working on social integration, social cohesion, intercultural programmes and security;
- Community organisations and religious representatives;
- Diaspora community members;
- Researchers working on risk of and resilience to radicalisation;
- The police, members of security services and other state actors involved in the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism.

Why use this toolkit?

This toolkit incorporates cutting-edge resilience and risk to radicalisation theory and practice based on the fieldwork with diaspora communities and key informants.

This toolkit is:

- ***User-friendly***
- ***Community-oriented***
- ***Comprehensive, and***
- ***Designed to be implemented by organisations without the need for an external facilitator.***

The toolkit is suitable for practitioners working with communities that wish to build community-scale resilience, and for organisations working in communities facing challenges that need to be addressed beyond the community level.

What is in this toolkit?

This toolkit presents an approach that will allow the user to:

- Identify and assess risks and challenges at community and individual level;
- Identify community resilience priorities and needs that require comprehensive assessment and intervention;
- Determine whether and how community and local-level resilience priorities align; and
- Identify entry points for building resilience at the community and local level.

How to use this toolkit

The tools (risk map, risk assessment framework and resilience assessment) are designed to be used by anyone and assume no prior familiarity with resilience. However, facilitation may make the process run more smoothly. The facilitator does not need to be an externally recruited professional. She/he can be someone from an organisation/institution familiar with the concepts presented in this toolkit.

This toolkit includes background information and a series of tools for implementing a risk and resilience assessment. It also includes advice on how to guide people through the necessary steps.

If the user has no prior experience with risk/resilience assessment, we recommend using the tools in this toolkit in the order in which they are presented. Each tool is designed to build on the information generated by the previous tools, and the tools are sequenced to best support understanding and application.

This toolkit is designed to be used by a multi-agency team; this is because building resilience requires consideration of multiple sectors and scales and involves multiple organisations and agencies. Engaging a range of these groups from the start will make the work more efficient and effective. The multi-agency team does not have to be fully developed to implement this toolkit. As the users implement the tools, the gaps in information and knowledge will help to identify who else needs to be in the team and which stakeholders and experts need to be part of the resilience-building process.

The next section provides the analytical overview of the three Risk and Resilience Assessment tools.

3 Modelling risk and resilience in diasporic communities in Europe

The map visualises transnational risk and resilience factors in two ways. The risk factors (disintegration, identity crisis, vulnerability to propaganda, etc.) and the resilience factors (integration, the role of credible voices, social media, education, intercultural dialogue, etc.) with dedicated signals are the main parts of the map. The main connecting lines represent the main transnational implications.

The content of the risk map is based on the empirical research conducted using semi-flex interviews and focus groups with members of diaspora communities in EU countries, key informants, practitioners and researchers working with diaspora communities.


The risk map was developed with the ArcGIS system. ArcGIS is a software programme that develops digital maps and geographical area analysis by managing, editing and featuring geospatial data. It was developed by ESRI (Environmental Systems Research Institute) and is compatible with desktop devices, mobile devices and the web. Its tools allow the depiction of qualitative and quantitative data on maps, such as indexes, correlations, narratives and short texts. Its visualisation is applied in different layers, providing a user-friendly environment.

Link to the map: <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/9991be9323f945ee968cd63a4bed7098>.

3.1 Structure and Content

Risk Factors

Risk Factor 1: Identity crisis, disintegration, discrimination.



Risk Factor 2: International geopolitics and military interventions, perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy.

4

Denmark

For the Palestinian Diaspora communities in Denmark the support of Israel from the west is a very important factor that could produce radicalization. Also, they refer to Western policies, especially in the case of Syria, as an attempt to divide the Arab world and also as a military intervention leading to the killing of thousands of Muslims in their own countries.

A map of Europe showing major cities and countries. A blue circle with the number 4 is placed over Denmark, specifically near Copenhagen. Other cities labeled include Oslo, Edinburgh, Belfast, Dublin, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham, Cardiff, London, Hamburg, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Cologne, Frankfurt am Main, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Paris, Luxembourg, and Prague. Countries labeled include IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, GERMANY, and NORWAY.

Risk Factor 3: Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state organisations.

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Risk Factor 4: Role of Internet/social media and dissemination of radical propaganda.


Risk Factor 5: External influence of state and non-state actors.

Risk Factor 6: Linkages with foreign terrorist fighters or other radicalised persons.

Resilience Factors

Resilience Factor 1: Successful integration – engagement and cooperation between the host country and the communities.

Resilience Factor 2: Community cohesion programmes linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives.




2. Community cohesion programs linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives

Ireland

In Ireland some Community Cohesion Programs have been initiated by the government and civil society organizations. These programs have aimed at building collective community resilience against radicalization. One example is “National Youth Council of Ireland”. The intervention was crucial and creates community cohesion spaces that break the silencing process of individual which is a hotspot for behaviours that might

Resilience Factor 3: Pluralistic inter-religion dialogue and initiatives to avoid the stigmatisation and separation of Islam from other religions.



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Germany

For diaspora communities in Germany inter-religious dialogue is considered important but in order to be fruitful, it needs to be genuine and exceed purely formalistic exchange. Interreligious dialogue is a demanding practice as it entails pushing the frontier of own convictions and trust-building. “It can be useful to start to gather around topics of common

Resilience Factor 4: Cooperation with the communities and engagement of credible and moderate voices.

Greece

The role of education in general is very important for integration. In details, the promotion of school activities and courses that spread the principles of Human Rights and the cultural and religious respect. The schools in Greece have some courses in this direction: "Environmental Education", "Social and political Education", "Sexuality Education", "Health Education" etc. More specifically: the main courses in the schools' programs "Modern Greek" and "Greek Literature" include sections for the respect of distinctness and the democratic values. Moreover, the English course has cultural sections. However, the most important change has been done in the "Religious Education": the schools have passed from a dogma dissemination approach to a

Resilience Factor 5: Counter-narratives, use of social media.

Transregional Dynamics/Movements

- International geopolitics and military interventions, perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy.
- Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state actors.
- External influence of state and non-state actors.



3.2 How to Use the Map

The risk map is a visualisation tool that can be used by practitioners, decision-makers and researchers as the basis for risk assessment and resilience actions. The risk map provides a user-friendly description of conditions in European countries based on risk and resilience. It visualises the main transregional risks and the potential linkages between the possible radicalisation of the diaspora communities and European security. Within this framework, the risk map can be used as a tool for the development of risk scenarios as part of the risk assessment procedure and as examples of resilience programmes as part of the resilience assessment. To this end, the user should combine the risk map with the two tools (risk assessment and resilience assessment) introduced below.

4 Community Risk Assessment (CRA)

Community Risk Assessment (CRA) is a participatory process for assessing challenges, vulnerabilities, risks and ability to cope, and for preparing coping strategies and a risk reduction options implementation plan for the local community. CRA uses scientific information, predictions and participatory discourses to identify, analyse and evaluate the risk environment of a particular community and reach consensus among community members on actions that are needed to manage the risk environment. The method recognises that the vulnerability, prevention or mitigation strategies and coping mechanisms vary from community to community and from group to group within a community.

4.1 Risk Factors

The assessment can be based on the use of the six risk factors identified in the PAVE project:

Risk Factor 1: Identity crisis, disintegration, discrimination

Identity crisis has been identified as one of the most important risk factors that can lead to violent extremism. In recent years, we have observed the engagement of young second- or third-generation

immigrants as perpetrators in many of the terrorist attacks in various EU countries. Among the different stories and backgrounds of these individuals, we can emphasise the issue of identity crisis and mainly the non-belonging phenomenon. Usually, the perception of non-belonging manifests as a disconnect between two worlds – the country of origin and the country of residence. An individual with identity confusion may feel detached from both countries.

Risk Factor 2: International geopolitics and military interventions/perceptions of a negative role for Western foreign policy

Another source of diaspora communities' radicalisation is Western foreign policy, especially Western interventions in predominantly Muslim countries. A central component of the ideology of violent jihad is the notion that Islam is under mortal threat, which leads to the argument that every good Muslim should fight in this battle between good and evil. The myth of Islam being fundamentally threatened is reproduced in the form of intensive propaganda distributed among young people who have the desire to act and seek a 'solution' to the perceived injustices and threats against Islam. According to jihadist ideology, there is a structural conflict between Islam and the West. In the latter stages, when the ideological pressure acquires political characteristics, the feeling that the Western powers have conspired against Islam is formed, resulting in a desire to establish a Caliphate in order to unite all Muslims under the law of Islam. This is the main argument put forward by ISIS, which significantly contributed to the wave of European 'foreign fighters' travelling to Syria and Iraq.

Risk Factor 3: Linkages with the home country and engagement with state and non-state organisations

Engagement by state and non-state organisations in the home country can play a role in shaping the position of diaspora groups. In some countries, political Islam has tended to operate through non-violent political channels to veer away from intolerant extremism.

Risk Factor 4: Role of Internet/social media and dissemination of radical propaganda

Online technologies, including social media, have many benefits, which are often leveraged by violent extremist groups. They make it possible to reach global audiences immediately, yet also to tailor messages to fit with different target audiences at the local level. This way, violent extremist groups are able to develop rich content for the mass market, and still recruit individuals with privacy protections. In this domain, violent extremist groups have proven to be innovative and adaptable, partially exploiting modern social communication systems and leveraging modern tools to achieve their aims.

Risk Factor 5: External influence of state and non-state actors

Violent non-state organisations, social movements and foreign states are among the main transregional actors that can affect the trends and factors of radicalisation. The main forms of external involvement are the promotion of conservative and radical interpretations of Islam and Islamism by Islamist activists and movements, and the involvement of foreign states in order to promote specific doctrines of Islam and to influence religious institutions and actors.

Risk Factor 6: Linkages with foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) or other radicalised persons

Foreign terrorist fighters are potential multipliers of violence when they leave the battlefields. Veteran jihadists are equipped with practical knowledge of warfare, training, recruitment, use of the media and, in particular, social media for the transmission of propaganda, and the manufacture of explosives, meaning that they are capable of transferring the conflict back to their homelands. While acknowledging that most FTF returnees disengage from violence, former ‘fighters’ who continue to be radicalised and are experienced in propaganda have a comparative advantage in approaching excluded and angry young individuals, whom they can radicalise using their personal stories and experiences.

4.2 How to Conduct a CRA

CRA is a method that involves local stakeholder groups coming together to prepare a consensus-based risk prevention strategy (action plan) through identification, assessment and analysis of specific risks in different vulnerable sectors. It is therefore important that representatives of relevant social groups and communities are identified and participate in the CRA process. CRA facilitators should have a basic understanding of the local social/community situations, people and their livelihoods, the type and extent of risks and challenges in the local landscape, and preparedness and prevention strategies for the existing risks. The process consists of the following five stages:

- 1. Scoping the Community.** Familiarising facilitators with the local risk environment and people’s livelihoods through resource mapping, focus group discussions, key informants interview, etc. Identifying stakeholders who will participate in the CRA. Collecting, analysing and validating secondary information with the community.
- 2. Identification of Challenges, Vulnerable Sectors and Conditions.** Dividing participants into separate stakeholder groups to identify the risks they face in their communities and associated vulnerable sectors and conditions.
- 3. Risk Analysis and Evaluation.** Analysing and evaluating the risk statements to ensure an accurate picture of the various vulnerabilities and their respective risks. This will allow the facilitators to prioritise or rank them according to the impact they may have on the various elements that make up a community.
- 4. Specific Risk Prevention Options and Action Planning.** Determining the most effective and appropriate options for the prevention, reduction and/or management of risks.
- 5. Consensus on Options.** Primary and secondary stakeholders jointly reviewing the compiled output of coping strategies recommended by separate primary stakeholder groups and agreeing on potential options.



5 Risk Assessment Matrix

A risk assessment matrix, also known as a probability and severity risk matrix, is a visual tool that depicts the potential risks affecting a community. The risk matrix is based on two intersecting factors: the likelihood that the risk event will occur, and the potential impact that the risk event will have on the community. In other words, it is a tool that helps to visualise the probability vs. the severity of a potential risk.

Depending on likelihood and severity, risks can be categorised as severe, high, moderate or low. As part of the risk assessment process, stakeholders and practitioners use risk matrices to help them prioritise different risks and develop an appropriate mitigation strategy.

			Impact			
			0 Acceptable	1 Tolerable	2 Unacceptable	3 Intolerable
			Little or No Effect	Effects are Felt but Not Critical	Serious Impact to Course of Action and Outcome	Could Result in Disasters
Likelihood	Improbable	Risk Unlikely to Occur				
	Possible	Risk Will Likely Occur				
	Probable	Risk Will Occur				

Risk Assessment Matrix

The risk assessment matrix works by presenting various risks as a chart, colour-coded by severity: severe risks in red, high risks in orange, moderate risks in yellow, and low risks in green. Every risk matrix also has two axes: one that measures likelihood, and another that measures impact.

Creating a risk assessment matrix does not have to be a complicated process. There are four basic steps to making a risk assessment matrix:

Step 1: Identify the Risk Landscape

To begin, hold brainstorming sessions with key stakeholders in the community so that the user can mine insights and start generating a list of ideas that will serve as the foundation of the risk assessment matrix. Since risk analysis is subjective, it is vital to get a wide variety of stakeholder input — doing so minimises the chances of missing something valuable.

Begin with the highest-level risks.

Step 2: Determine the Risk Criteria

After brainstorming risks associated with the larger risk landscape, determine the criteria by which these risks will be evaluated. As mentioned earlier, risk assessment matrices typically use two intersecting criteria:

- **Likelihood:** the level of probability that the risk will occur.
- **Impact:** the level of severity that the risk will have.

Step 3: Assess the Risks

Assess the risks based on your risk criteria, providing a qualitative risk analysis according to a pre-defined scale.

- Severe risk
- High risk
- Medium risk
- Low risk

Step 4: Prioritise the Risks

Compare the different levels of risk (severe, high, medium or low) to the risk criteria (likelihood and impact). Prioritise those risks with the highest likelihood and impact.

Keep in mind that the risk landscape is constantly evolving. The risk assessment matrix should be updated multiple times a year in order to reflect the changing risk environment. Failure to update the risk assessment strategy could result in emerging risks being missed.

			Impact			
			0	1	2	3
			Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	Intolerable
			Little or No Effect	Effects are Felt but Not Critical	Serious Impact to Course of Action and Outcome	Could Result in Disasters
Likelihood	Improbable	Risk Unlikely to Occur				
	Possible	Risk Will Likely Occur		Role of the West	External Influence	Linkages with FTF's
	Probable	Risk Will Occur	Identity Crisis	Social Media		

Risk Assessment Matrix filled with data on transnational dimension of radicalisation factors

6 Resilience Assessment

6.1 Resilient Communities

The aim of protective interventions is to encourage community and religious leaders to take steps to monitor and counter radicalisation processes within their communities (Whine, 2009). Curtis and Jaine (2012) highlight arguments that diasporas should not solely be viewed in terms of potential social problems but rather as important resources and ideal subjects for initiatives in relationship-building. Ranstorp and Hyllengren (2013) emphasise that women can play an important role in preventing extremism. They argue that Muslim women should not be seen as silent victims, but rather as potential influential advocates of anti-extremist measures. Finally, some experts emphasise the importance of developing credible counter-narratives to those of radical and extremist groups (Schmid, 2013; Parent and Ellis, 2013).

The outcome of this research was the development of the concept of resilient communities as major drivers for prevention or radicalisation leading to violent extremism within diaspora communities. Resilience refers to the process of overcoming the negative effects of risk exposure, coping successfully with traumatic experiences, and avoiding the negative trajectories associated with risks (Fergus and Zimmerman, 2005). Researchers have identified three models of resilience – compensatory, protective, and challenge – that explain how promotive factors operate to alter the trajectory from risk exposure to negative outcome (Fergus and Zimmerman, 2005). A compensatory model is defined when a promotive factor counteracts or operates in an opposite direction of a risk factor. A compensatory model therefore involves a direct effect of a promotive factor on an outcome. Another model of resilience is the protective factor model. In this model, assets or resources moderate or reduce the effects of a risk on a negative outcome. A third model of resilience is the challenge model. In this model, the association between a risk factor and an outcome is curvilinear. This suggests that exposure to low levels and high levels of a risk factor are associated with negative outcomes, but moderate levels of the risk are related to less negative (or positive) outcomes.

Social connection is at the heart of resilient communities and suggests that any strategy to increase community resilience must both harness and enhance existing social connections while endeavouring to not damage or diminish them (Ellis and Abdi, 2017). Three types of social connections are critical to a resilient community in relation to violent extremism (Ellis and Abdi, 2017). First, social connections within and between communities specifically mitigate risk factors associated with violent extremism; within communities refers to individuals that share similar social identities (termed social bonding), and between communities refers to groups composed of individuals with diverse social identities but who share a common sense of community in some other way (termed social bridging). Second, the role of social connection between communities and institutions or governing bodies (termed social linking) provides an opportunity for addressing social injustice and building structures for intervention with youths who start down that path. Finally, CBPR, a model of community engagement and partnership in research, provides a road map for how to enhance these types of social connections and build resilient communities (Ellis and Abdi, 2017).

RAN (2018) provides a set of protective factors as part of the general resilience to violent extremism concept:

1. To protect against political alienation, focus on democratic citizenship.
2. To protect against apocalyptic ideology, offer religious knowledge.
3. To protect against identity crises, stimulate personal participation.
4. To protect against the pull of the extremist milieu, provide a warm and/or supported family environment.
5. To help individuals resist negative influences from friendship and kinship, cultivate autonomy and self-esteem.
6. To protect from (feelings of) exclusion, enhance social coping skills (RAN 2018).

The PAVE Resilience Model is based on five protective/resilience factors:

Resilience Factor 1: Successful integration – engagement and cooperation between the host country and the communities.

Resilience Factor 2: Community cohesion programmes linked with prevention of radicalisation initiatives.

Resilience Factor 3: Pluralistic inter-religion dialogue and initiatives to avoid the stigmatisation and separation of Islam from other religions.

Resilience Factor 4: Cooperation with the communities and engagement of credible and moderate voices.

Resilience Factor 5: Counter-narratives, use of social media.



Resilience Assessment Cycle

The decisions about suitable and effective resilience plans and initiatives should be based on utilising the resilience assessment cycle as well as the risk matrix. The resilience assessment cycle is as follows:



6.2 Resilience Matrix

The resilience matrix allows the practitioner and/or the decision-maker to take the risks and challenges identified using the risk assessment procedure, along with any specialist assessments, and group that information under the four headings of resilience, vulnerability, protective environment and adversity.

A resilience matrix is a visual tool that combines the potential risks affecting a community with suggested resilience measures. The resilience matrix is based on three intersecting factors: the likelihood that an identified risk event will occur, the potential impact that the risk event will have on the community and the proposed resilience measures that the community and the state authorities should apply. In other words, it is a tool that helps to match and visualise the probability and the severity of a potential risk with the suitable resilience measures.

As part of the risk assessment process, stakeholders and practitioners use resilience matrices to help them prioritise different risks and develop an appropriate mitigation strategy.

6.3 How to Make a Resilience Assessment Matrix

Creating a resilience assessment matrix does not have to be a complicated process. It involves three basic steps:

Step 1: Present the Risks

To begin, use the risk analysis, the main outcome of the risk assessment process. Present the identified risks as possible risk scenarios. Since risk analysis is subjective, it is vital to obtain a wide variety of stakeholder input — doing so minimises the chances of missing something valuable.

Begin with the highest-level risks.

Step 2: Prioritise the Risks

Compare the different levels of risk (severe, high, medium or low) to the risk criteria (likelihood and impact). Prioritise those risks with the highest likelihood and impact.

Keep in mind that the risk landscape is constantly evolving. The risk assessment matrix should be updated multiple times a year in order to reflect the changing risk environment. Failure to update the risk assessment strategy can result in emerging risks being missed.


Step 3: Apply Resilience Actions

Based on the risk scenarios and the prioritisation of the risks, resilience actions at different levels of decision-making (community, local, national, transnational) can be developed (see Annex 1).

7 Conclusion: Tips

- Valid evaluations are necessarily dependent on the quality and completeness of information on the indicators.
- The tools cannot predict who will become a violent extremist or terrorist.
- The tools offer a systematic professional analysis of the risks by applying relevant and transparent risk indicators for violent extremism.
- The tools may be used to establish the risk status for diaspora communities in relation to violent extremism.
- They can also provide support for preventive programmes and decisions on resilience and mitigation interventions.
- Regular and systematic re-assessments are possible due to the dynamic nature of various risk indicators.

- Unpredictable and dynamic factors such as events at the personal, local or global level can also trigger unexpected violent acts.
- Risk assessment tools can have harmful effects – such as stigmatisation of communities or former extremists – if used carelessly or incorrectly.
- Risk assessment tools may contribute to alienation or threaten reintegration.
- Especially during rehabilitation and transition periods, tools should focus on resilience factors and include an assessment of needs and how they can be met.



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Annex 1: Example of Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Resilience Actions
Identity crisis	Youngsters, mainly second- or third-generation of immigrants, show a strong identity crisis and sense of non-belonging to the community and the host society.	Probable/Risk will occur	Acceptable	<p>Ireland: Cohesion programmes initiated by the government and civil society organisations, aimed at building collective community resilience against radicalisation (e.g. 'National Youth Council of Ireland').</p> <p>Germany: Through the organisation of community gatherings on weekends, cultural events such as literary evenings, well-prepared Friday prayers, religion classes and Bosnian language classes, young community members are supported in positively affirming their Bosniak origins and embracing their identity as multidimensional.</p> <p>Spain: The Amazighs' social networks created a space to share historical and cultural findings that Amazigh individuals have made personally. For example, they share family stories and try to re-create history from the point of view of the Amazigh people (instead of the Moroccan or European point of view). This has allowed them to find a source of knowledge about their</p>

					own culture and identity through social media.
Disintegration	A new generation of migrants and refugees, with many new people having arrived from war-torn regions with deep sectarian divisions, which could act as an inhibiting factor for integration.	Probable/Risk will occur	Tolerable		<p>Ireland: Integration programmes devised after international radicalised events such as the 9/11 attacks, e.g. the 'Garda Diversity' programme.</p> <p>Greece: The role of education in general is very important for integration. This particularly includes school activities and courses that promote the principles of human rights and respect for other cultures and religions.</p>
Negative perception of Western foreign policy in the MENA region	Many young members of the community refer to Western policies, especially in the case of Syria, as an attempt to divide the Arab world and as a military intervention leading to the killing of thousands of Muslims in their own countries.	Probable/Risk will occur	Tolerable		<p>Ireland: A very specific example is the 'Safe Haven' training programme run by Dublin City Interfaith Forum. 'Safe Haven' is an attempt to amplify credible voices as it works with religious leaders and members of different faith communities, and specifically addresses the issue of religiously motivated hate crime. The cooperation with the communities and attempts like Safe Haven also provide a resilient basis on which to understand the various factors of radicalisation and equips the participants with skills to respond to it.</p>
External influence of	Salafi jihadist organisations in	Probable/Risk will occur	Unacceptable		<p>Germany: Education of the imam is key to prevent</p>

non-state actors	the EU country are well connected with other organisations in third countries and there is stable communication and exchange between the two networks.	radicalisation in diaspora communities. In-depth theological education enables the imam to be able to counter radicalising narratives from a theological angle. A well-educated Imam is key to preventing radicalisation of members of his congregation.
Linkages with FTFs	Many youngsters with a strong identity crisis have direct and daily contact with FTFs from past generations (people who joined Al-Qaeda and travelled to the MENA region).	Possible/Risk Intolerable will likely occur
		<p>Germany: Counter-narratives to strict friend-foe worldviews and glorification of violence; raising young people's awareness of the value of heterogeneity and multi-perspective approaches.</p> <p>Ireland: The 'Muslim Sisters of Eire' initiative sends the message that 'if you are young and want to fight in Syria, come and feed the homeless and there is no need to take a gun to help'.</p>